No Babies, No Future: How East Asia's Population Freefall Threatens Global Order

In recent years, the decline in population across East Asian countries has grown into a major crisis, bringing with it significant economic, social, psychological, and even security and geopolitical consequences. This crisis, which began in earnest in the 1970s, has accelerated at an unprecedented pace in recent years, drawing most East Asian nations into its challenges.


Latest statistics from reputable sources reveal record-low fertility rates: South Korea (0.72), China (1.09), Taiwan (0.87), and Singapore (0.97). These figures are far below the population replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman, indicating that the decline is now a deeply entrenched structural phenomenon rather than a temporary fluctuation.


Key Drivers of the Crisis

Experts cite several main factors behind the low fertility rates in East Asia, particularly Japan: an intense and lengthy work culture, high housing, education, and healthcare costs, restrictive birth policies in previous decades, heavy traditional expectations of women in family care, and cultural shifts that have transformed long-held norms.


Japan: The Epicenter and Policy Testing Ground
Japan stands at the forefront of this crisis and has become a testing ground for demographic policy experiments. It was the first country in the world to enter a “super-aged” society. Since the first birth records began in 1899, the number of births has steadily declined, reaching a record low in 2024 — fewer than 700,000 births. In contrast, deaths reached 1.6 million, causing an unprecedented net population loss of 900,000 in a single year.

Despite years of government efforts — including cash subsidies for children, cultural allowances, and expanded parental leave — no significant improvement has occurred. Experts warn that if current trends continue, Japan’s population, now around 124 million, could fall to 87 million by 2070, at which point 40% of the population would be aged 65 or older.

The Vicious Cycle of Demographic Decline

Even traditional pro-birth policies have failed to reverse the trend. A shrinking pool of young workers is placing heavier financial pressure on pension and healthcare systems. This in turn makes family formation more difficult, further discouraging younger generations from having children — creating a self-reinforcing cycle of decline.

Immigration: A Limited and Temporary Relief
One response in recent years has been to adjust immigration policies. Despite historically strict immigration rules, Japan’s foreign resident population has grown to 3.6 million in 2025. Yet, in the context of a population exceeding 125 million, this remains small and insufficient to quickly alter demographic structures. Integration challenges and cultural barriers further limit the long-term impact, making immigration more of a temporary palliative than a structural solution.

Policy Recommendations for Slowing the Decline
Many experts argue that reversing the trend requires first reforming outdated restrictive laws and overhauling the work culture by reducing working hours and overtime. Long-term measures should include providing widely accessible and affordable public childcare, ensuring robust support for mothers, and implementing sustainable immigration policies alongside genuine cultural integration.

Social reforms should extend beyond the traditional model of marriage and family, facilitating access to education and healthcare, leveraging robotics to support elderly care, and investing in economic and social programs that make raising children more feasible and attractive. By easing structural barriers and providing real, consistent incentives, East Asian societies may begin to mitigate the trajectory of their demographic crisis.


*Translated by Ashraf Hemmati from the original Persian article written by Navid Daneshvar