Pashinyan's peace is a master class in capitulation

Former Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian published an article titled "Pashinyan's Peace: A Master Class in Capitulation," which refers to the conclusion of negotiations on the text of the draft peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

“Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, for the sake of preserving his own power, once again revealed the full extent of his political incompetence, strategic shortsightedness, and astonishing willingness to capitulate in what can only be described as a tragic nadir (a period of extreme decline) of modern Armenian diplomacy.

His latest statement, which represents the end of negotiations on a so-called “peace agreement” with Azerbaijan, should not be confused with a diplomatic achievement. It is, in fact, the clearest admission that Pashinyan has completely compromised the Armenian national interest at the negotiating table.

Let’s start with the blatant, inexcusable omissions that underlie this disgrace. As reported, the agreement makes no mention of Azerbaijan’s withdrawal from Armenia’s sovereign but currently occupied territories. It says nothing about the release of Armenian prisoners illegally held in Baku, nor does it acknowledge the plight of the forcibly displaced Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh or affirm their right to return. These are not mere omissions; they are deliberate exclusions that amount to abdication of fundamental national concerns.

"Pashinyan does not make even the slightest attempt to justify this deafening silence. The very essence of the conflict is set aside, as if it were unimportant," Oskanyan wrote.

In his opinion, according to Pashinyan’s statements, Armenia made two final concessions, and now the agreement is “ready to be signed.” “But for whom is it ready? Ready, perhaps, for Azerbaijan, which has already achieved tangible territorial and political gains through military aggression and diplomatic pressure. What is achieved by this deal is not peace, it is the official codification of Armenia’s subordination. It rewards the use of force, legitimizes the spoils of war, and treats Armenia’s sovereignty as a negotiable item on the list of Azerbaijani demands.

And yet, even this act of self-abasement may not bring finality. Two scenarios are now possible, each darker than the previous one. In the first case, Azerbaijan, having Armenian written concessions, may not sign the document at all. Instead, it may prefer to wait, confident that Armenia will unilaterally implement the agreed measures, such as amending the Constitution and dissolving the OSCE Minsk Group.

In the second scenario, Azerbaijan could sign the document at the ceremonial level but delay ratification in parliament, as Turkey did in the case of the infamous Armenian-Turkish protocols in 2010. This tactic would allow Baku to continue to exert pressure, extracting further Armenian concessions under the pretext of “unfulfilled obligations.” That painful episode (related to the Armenian-Turkish protocols - ed.) should have been permanently etched in the memory of Armenian diplomacy. Instead, under Pashinyan, we are witnessing an almost exact reproduction of that humiliation. Once again, Armenia offers big concessions at the beginning, while its partner reserves the right to delay implementation, demand more, and ultimately walk away if resistance arises from the Armenian side.

Regardless of which path Azerbaijan chooses, the result is the same: the continued erosion of Armenian dignity, sovereignty, and security. Among the most alarming elements is the prospect of constitutional change under foreign pressure, an act that borders on political self-destruction. It is nothing less than national suicide. The very idea that Armenia could rewrite its fundamental laws to meet the preconditions of an aggressor state is a grim echo of the worst post-conflict reconciliation disasters in modern history.

If this agreement is signed, it will not herald the dawn of a new era of peace. Rather, it will signal the official end of the Armenian chapter in the long and tragic history of Nagorno-Karabakh. This is not a peace achieved through dialogue and reconciliation: it is a peace achieved through coercion, imbalance, and a strategic vacuum. It will be signed not with dignity, but with resignation, perhaps even despair.

And let there be no illusions. Azerbaijan understands this perfectly well. They know that they are not signing the agreement with the Armenian nation. They are signing the agreement with Nikol Pashinyan and his narrow circle of political loyalists, whose primary concern is not national integrity, but personal survival. By giving up so much for so little, Pashinyan can secure (Aliyev's - ed.) signature, but no peace, no security and, of course, no forgiveness from history," Oskanyan wrote.