For decades after World War II, the United States was widely regarded as the defensive arsenal of the Western world and the self-proclaimed guardian of democracy. Relying on advanced technology and continuous military innovation, Washington consistently stayed one step ahead of its rivals. Today, however, despite possessing the world’s largest defense budget, the United States appears to be facing deep structural problems in reproducing its military power—problems that are gradually handing the initiative in defense production and innovation to its long‑standing rival, China. In essence, the U.S. defense industry is grappling with profound and systemic challenges that demand serious corrective action.
According to assessments conducted this year by oversight bodies and multiple think tanks, the United States is experiencing a severe crisis within its defense industrial sector. It has lost the ability to rapidly and efficiently produce the equipment required by its armed forces. Recent reports indicate that the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is no longer capable of meeting growing demand, particularly for critical munitions such as 155‑millimeter artillery shells and Stinger missiles—both of which have been heavily consumed in support of Ukraine. This crisis stems from a shortage of skilled labor, fragile supply chains, and insufficient investment in emerging technologies. At its core, the problem is rooted in the paradigm that has governed U.S. defense industries since the 1990s.
Under this paradigm, the U.S. defense sector underwent massive consolidation, merging into just five major defense corporations—a development famously referred to as the “Last Supper” of the American defense industry. As a result, monopoly control over military design and production gradually fell into the hands of these firms. Over time, their priorities shifted away from innovation, cost reduction, and technological advancement, toward guaranteed profits and the satisfaction of shareholders.
At the same time, the U.S. defense industry adopted a just‑in‑time production model. While this approach has proven effective in civilian industries for lowering costs, it has become a strategic disaster in the military sphere. During the Ukraine war, American defense manufacturers were unable to replenish strategic stockpiles in a timely manner, clearly demonstrating that just‑in‑time production poses serious risks to U.S. national security. This crisis is not merely technical in nature; it is the outcome of long‑term policies that favored short‑term corporate profits while neglecting investment in production capacity. The result is a diminished ability to respond to global threats, as the United States struggles to produce or replace military equipment quickly and at reasonable cost.
One of the most significant consequences of this crisis is America’s growing lag behind China. Through a civil‑military fusion strategy—particularly in shipbuilding—China has successfully leveraged civilian industries to serve military objectives, achieving production capacity estimated to be roughly 230 times greater than that of the United States. As a result, China now commands the world’s largest navy, with more than 370 warships, and is actively seeking to expand this number to 435. By contrast, the U.S. Navy operates around 290 warships, many of which spend months awaiting maintenance and repairs. This imbalance means that in the event of a military confrontation between the United States and China in the Taiwan Strait, America’s strategic military capabilities could be depleted in less than ten days, with limited capacity for rapid replacement—while China would face no such constraint.
Furthermore, the complacency of major U.S. defense contractors in the field of hypersonic innovation has allowed China to pull ahead. China has developed multiple generations and classes of anti‑ship missiles capable of targeting U.S. forces, whereas the United States has yet to establish a comparable balance in this domain. From a strategic perspective, this gap reflects Washington’s excessive focus on expensive and highly vulnerable weapons systems, while China prioritizes mass production and rapid innovation. This divergence has the potential to alter the balance of power in the Pacific and may ultimately force the United States to undertake a fundamental reassessment of its China containment strategy.
In conclusion, the United States is facing a systemic crisis in military production—one that cannot be explained by budgetary constraints alone. The absence of a flexible industrial environment, excessive dependence on large contractors, and lagging performance in critical industries all suggest that the U.S. military would encounter serious limitations in a prolonged conflict, such as a potential war in the Taiwan Strait. Without revitalizing infrastructure, reforming procurement processes, and strengthening both the workforce and supply chains, the future outlook remains bleak. If structural reforms are not implemented, the gap between America’s claims of power and realities on the ground will continue to widen, further eroding U.S. credibility within the international system.
Translated by Ashraf Hemmati from the original Persian article written by Mohammad Mahdi Esmaeilkhanian
