Petrodollars and Mirage Diplomacy: The Arab Sheikhs’ Illusory Gamble in Syria
The dramatic fall of Bashar al-Assad's government caught the Persian Gulf's Arab regimes off guard. While they had long opposed al-Assad's rule having distanced themselves from Damascus since the onset of the Syrian rebellion in 2011 and pushed for Syria’s expulsion from the Arab League their political posture has shifted significantly over the past six years.
By: H. Zaïm-Bashi
The dramatic fall of Bashar al-Assad's government caught the Persian Gulf's Arab regimes off guard. While they had long opposed al-Assad's rule having distanced themselves from Damascus since the onset of the Syrian rebellion in 2011 and pushed for Syria’s expulsion from the Arab League their political posture has shifted significantly over the past six years.
The Persian Gulf's littoral Arab sheikhdoms began normalizing relations with al-Assad’s government reopening their embassies in Damascus that had been shuttered in the wake of the civil war. This rapprochement stemmed from the increasingly untenable situation associated with maintaining al-Assad isolated particularly given the apparent stability of his grip on power. Syria's reintegration into the Arab League underscored by President al-Assad's personal participation in last year’s summit in Saudi Arabia heralded a significant rehabilitation of his administration within the Arab world.
However with the precipitous collapse of al-Assad’s government and his subsequent flight to Moscow the Persian Gulf states now find themselves uniquely positioned to capitalize on the unfolding situation to advance their geopolitical and economic ambitions. In fact this transformation presents an extraordinary opportunity for Persian Gulf Arab nations to consolidate their political leverage in Syria’s reconstruction all the while accommodating Turkey’s expanding footprint in the war-torn country.
Turkey while actively supporting Syrian rebels finds itself increasingly preoccupied with countering U.S.-backed Kurdish militias in northern Syria. This focus has hindered Ankara's ability to effectively tackle the multifaceted challenges prevalent in Syria's Arab-dominated regions. Additionally Turkey's financial constraints are starkly illustrated by the United Nations' estimation of a staggering $400 billion required for the reconstruction of Syria highlighting the urgent need for external assistance or in other terms the Arab regime's petrodollars.
This moment of flux offers Arab sheikhdoms a unique chance to assert themselves in the Levant. Collaborating with Turkey could endow the wealthy Arab regimes with both legitimacy and a pathway to funnel substantial financial resources into Syria’s rebuilding efforts. Thus far the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (PGCC) states have evidently seized upon this prospect as demonstrated by their willingness to finance what is increasingly viewed as Turkey’s neo-Ottoman dreams.
The new Syrian government has already unveiled ambitious transnational infrastructure proposals including the Qatari gas pipeline Iraqi oil routes and Saudi hydrogen conduits all of which would traverse Syrian territory en route to global energy markets. The geopolitical centrality of Syria underscored by its position along critical international trade corridors and energy transit routes makes it a linchpin for connecting the oil-rich Persian Gulf Arab states and Iraq with Turkey’s access to European markets.
In this regard during a recent visit to Damascus the PGCC Secretary-General emphasized this strategic interdependence proclaiming that Persian Gulf states stand firmly with the new Syrian regime. Similarly Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Abdullah Ali Al-Yahia reaffirmed the GCC's commitment to Syria’s territorial unity and stability framing the country’s security as inseparable from that of the Persian Gulf and regional stability.
Syria's new rulers too have underscored the nation’s pivotal role in facilitating these international projects. They highlight Syria’s potential to serve as a conduit between energy-producing regions in the Persian Gulf and Europe enhancing its strategic indispensability. Yet this optimistic vision hinges upon a singular prerequisite: stability. Without it neither Turkey nor the Persian Gulf Arab regimes will be able to marshal the financial resources required to realize their aspirations.
Regrettably the current trajectory suggests a grim outlook. Under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa Syria seems poised to follow the paths of Libya and Sudan—descending into protracted civil strife and perpetual disunion. Such a scenario would render the reconstruction of Syria an impossibility leaving the Persian Gulf Arab states' ambitions for petrodollar-fueled ventures in the new Syrian landscape as little more than a mirage.
Thus the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf must tread with more circumspection. Until Syria’s new government demonstrates a credible commitment to unity peace and national reconciliation any investments made risk exacerbating unrest and exporting instability to other Arab nations. Prudence dictates that the Persian Gulf states wait for tangible signs of stability before advancing their economic and geopolitical agendas lest they squander resources on a quagmire that perpetuates regional turmoil.